Building a Secure Local Area Network by Atsemegiorgis, Tamirat
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tamirat Atsemegiorgis 
 
Building a Secure Local Area Network  
Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied Sciences 
Bachelor of Engineering  
Information Technology  
Bachelor’s Thesis 
6 May 2013 
 Abstract 
 
 
Author(s) 
Title 
 
Number of Pages 
Date 
Tamirat Atsemegiorgis 
Building a Secure Local Area Networking  
 
41+ 6 appendices  
6 May 2013 
Degree Information Technology 
Degree Programme Bachelor of Engineering 
Specialisation option Communication and Data Networks 
Instructor(s) 
 
Erik Pätynen, Senior Lecturer 
 
 
The goal of this final year project was to study the vulnerability of a small company network 
system and build a secure Local Area Network that would be capable of providing network 
resources and services as well as Internet connections to local users and a limited access 
of network service to public users. 
 
To accomplish the project, a simulated network system was built in the laboratory and 
network devices were configured for layer 2 and 3 security features, the firewall was de-
ployed to filter out the incoming and outgoing IP traffic, VPN remote client access technol-
ogy and wireless connection were deployed. The simulated network was found to be secu-
rity-tight, working for end-to-end client connections, working for Internal connection, work-
ing for remote client connections through Internet or wireless connection, and being ac-
cessible to the public user.  
 
It can be concluded that unless security measures are planned and implemented, a com-
pany network system will be vulnerable to a computer attack that might cause damage to 
the company’s resources and assets. Small companies, which want to build a well secured 
Local Area Network, will benefited if they adopt the security measures and practices of this 
project and implement them along with their own companies’ specific security policy.   
 
As the network grows in size, a user authentication at the local database is not efficient 
and here by, it is recommended to anyone who is interested in studying the subject further 
in the future to enhance the security system of the project by incorporating RADIUS-based 
authentication and explore advanced encryption methods for wireless networks. 
 
Keywords Local Area Network, attack, security, vulnerabilities, security 
policy 
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1 Introduction 
 
In today’s interconnected world it is irrational to believe a computer network system is 
immune from an attacks or think of it as too small to be considered as a predator by 
intruders to gain whatever advantage they need. Sometimes company owners de-
ceived by thinking that company’s resource are not highly valued and hence, they are 
not worth to be targeted. The reality is even at this moment companies are losing a 
significant amount money and wealth because of negligence or lack of awareness 
about the security issues.  
 
On the other hand smart leaders are taking steps not to be victims of globally-based 
cyber-attacks. Companies’ managers are spending a considerable amount of money to 
protect their resources and assets in order to achieve sustainable growth and stability 
on the course as desired. It is worth spending money and energy on asses’ network 
vulnerability and to identify the possible threats that might cause damage to the current 
system and resources. This will help in developing an effective security policy that dic-
tates what to do and by whom in the situation when a system is under an attack coming 
from inside or outside the company's premises. Hence these days it is absolutely nec-
essary for companies to pay special attention to tightening their security layers to exist 
as companies and contest at the global level.   
 
The purpose of this project is to design a Local Area Network (LAN) for a small compa-
ny and study the vulnerability of the system and implement security measures to pro-
tect network resources and system services. To do so, I will deal with the physical and 
logical design of a LAN by  building a network in a test laboratory, consisting of com-
puters, a ASA (Appliance Security Appliance) 5505 firewall, and switches and then 
configuring them for end-to-end connectivity and finally applying security layers on 
those devices  needed to keep the system safe.  
 
The goal of this thesis is to examine the security issues of the Local Area Network set 
up for a small company and build a secure LAN system and also to recommend the 
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best practices that would help to protect the network system from internal and external 
attacks. 
 
. 
 
2 Network Topology Design 
 
2.1 Network Design 
 
This day’s most organizations build their own LAN infrastructure with special considera-
tion of security measures to protect their resources from any kind of attacks. Building a 
well-secured LAN requires designing of network topology before deciding which physi-
cal devices to be purchased or technologies to deploy. A topology design is defined as 
the identification of networks and their interconnection points, the size and the scope of 
the network, and the type of interconnecting devices used.  
 
Basically network design is one of the four phases of PDIOO (Plan Design Implement 
Operate Optimize) life cycle. In this phase of the network life cycle, the designer’s task 
will be to develop the physical and logical design of the network project. The physical 
design of the network is concerned with the identification of LAN and WAN technolo-
gies and network devices that are supposed to realize the performance of the logical 
design at large. During this phase, the network designer is responsible for selecting 
devices such as cabling wires, switches, bridges, routers, wireless access point and 
others. As we can see the logical design phase is a foundation for the physical network 
design, and it is where the designer develops a hierarchical and modular network. This 
phase includes designing of network layer addressing, selection of switching and rout-
ing protocols, security planning and network management design. Also the complexity 
of the topology depends on the size of the network and traffic characteristics of the 
system. [1,5,283] 
 
2.2 Flat Network Design 
 
A flat network topology is an unstructured type of network designing metrology, which 
is adequate in designing a small-sized network. It is a non-hierarchical designing model 
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where each inter-networking device performs the same task. This model is easy to 
plan, design and implement for small-sized networks but it would be difficult to scale up 
the network when a need for growth arises and also the network might perform unex-
pected functions as the network expands in size. In addition to that, lack of hierarchy 
makes network troubleshooting and expansion difficult. Figure 1 below shows flat net-
work design for a local area network. [1,122] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Flat Network Topology Design. Copied from Etutorials (2013) [2] 
 
The design illustrated in figure 1 consists of workstations, printers, servers and switch-
es that belongs to the same broadcast domain and shares the same bandwidth togeth-
er. Flat topology uses a media-access control process such as carrier sense multiple 
access collision detection (CSMA/CD) or token passing technology to control access to 
the shared bandwidth. The absence of modularity in a flat network design courses all 
network devices to be in the same subnet and receives a copy of every message sent. 
Besides that, in the case of link failure it is difficult to get an alternative path to the des-
tination. [2] 
 
2.3 Hierarchical Network Design 
 
Switch  Switch  Switch  
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As discussed in section 2.2, when an organization's network grows and becomes more 
complex; a flat network designing model would not work. Hence the network designers 
might need to consider building a network in a modular approach. A modular designing 
helps to split the huge and complex task by a specific function and makes the design 
project more manageable. For instance, a company network system might include the 
company’s LANs, remote-access system, wireless connection system and WAN func-
tionalities, in such scenario a hierarchical modelling methods fit well.[4,102] 
 
Basically, a hierarchical model is a three-layer modular and structural design technique 
used to design a LAN or WAN network. Such a designing model helps to build a com-
pany’s network into discrete layers consisting of many interrelated components. Tech-
nically speaking, a hierarchical model design has three layers, namely Core, Distribu-
tion and Access layers, as shown in the figure 2 below. Each layer has its own func-
tions and they are built using network devices like routers or switches or combined in 
single device. [3,102] 
Figure 2.  Hierarchical Network. Copied from Dinicolo (2013) [ 3] 
 
There are many advantages in using a hierarchical model of designing a network, 
among those bring cost saving, scalability, flexibility, adaptability, simplicity, improved 
fault isolation and easer network manageability. 
 
Core layer 
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A core layer is a high-speed switching backbone responsible for interconnecting distri-
bution layers devices. This layer aggregates traffic from all distribution layers devices 
and is responsible for forwarding a large amount of data with a high speed over the 
network. To increase the data throughput of the network, packet filtering and other poli-
cy-based configurations have to be avoided from the core layer since they add unnec-
essary latency to the network and also have a significant impact on the network man-
ageability. [4,8] 
 
Furthermore, the core layer needs to be highly reliable and fault tolerant. This happens 
by establishing a full mesh redundancy link between the core layer routers and be-
tween the distribution layer routers and vice versa. Besides that, it is necessary to have 
backup power supplies in case of power failures. [4,10] 
 
Distribution layer 
 
The distribution layer is a middle layer between the access and core layer of a network. 
In other words it is considered a demarcation point between these layers. It is at this 
point where traffic flow control and access control takes place. More often, the distribu-
tion layer is a preferred place for designing virtual LANs (VLANs) to create one or more 
broadcast domains and to configure network devices like routers to route IP packets 
across VLANs. Besides that, the access layer is used to implement different functionali-
ties that concern about network policies, IP addressing, area aggregation and also 
quality of services (QoS).  
 
The distribution layer hides detailed topology information of the access layer from the 
core layer by address summarization, likewise it does core layer destination address 
summarization and hides the information from access layer devices. The distribution 
layer helps to improve core layer performance in connecting networks that run different 
protocols and also by redistributing between bandwidth-intensive access layer routing 
protocols such as IGRP (Interior Gateway Routing Protocol) and optimized core routing 
protocols such as EIGRP (Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol). [1,146] 
 
Access layer 
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The main task of the access layer is to connect local users to the network so that they 
can access network resources and services. This layer is designed to deliver local user 
packets to the targeted end user computer and also to ensure a legitimate access of 
network resources and services. End devices such as personal computers, printers 
and IP phones are connected to the access layer. Besides that, interconnecting devic-
es such as routers, switches, hubs and wireless access point can be part of the access 
layer.  [6,5] 
3 Overview of Network Security  
 
3.1 Security Analysis 
 
People in a society were used to guard their warehouse where they store their property 
and valuable treasures. The absence of such security may cause losses of properties 
and the human life. Likewise computer resources need to be protected from inside and 
outside intruders or saboteurs [8,201]. The only way of ensuring a complete computer 
security is by restricting all physical and logical access to a system. Obviously, total 
segregation of computers from one another creates a safe security zone; on the other 
hand, the system loses data communications, which makes the system useless. [7,3] 
 
As known, a computer is more useful when it is a part of a network system. A net-
worked environment helps to increase human productivity as well as, to create a con-
ducive environment for the company to compete on the global stage. However it is im-
portant to take some security precautions in order to reduce or if possible to avoid the 
security risks caused by unauthorized access to the system resources and services 
that jeopardize the company's productivity as well as well-being.  [8,6]  
 
Companies work tirelessly to maximize their profits. To do so they use the fastest ways 
of communication. Today, the Internet is the cheapest, fastest and easiest means of 
communication to conduct business at global level. The Internet has changed the way 
people live, and work and has even revolutionized the way business is conducted. Be-
sides the possibilities, Internet misses a security component and hence, a local net-
work without security measures is at great risk of losing resources and assets. [7,3] 
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Treats are not only from external but also from trusted workers and retired former em-
ployees of the company. Hence, today a company needs to implement effective securi-
ty measures to protect their valuable network resources against attacks. At this point it 
is worth defining what network security is; it has been perceived and defined in numer-
ous ways in different books but according to cisco, it is defined as follows: 
 
“Network security includes the detection and prevention of 
unauthorized access to both the network elements and those devices 
attached to the network. This includes everything from preventing 
unauthorized switch port access to detecting and preventing 
unauthorized network traffic from both inside and outside the 
corporate network.” [7,7] 
 
The main reason for implementing network security is to secure the network and sys-
tem resources connected to the network. Information in any form is considered a valu-
able property of the network and losing or releasing it might cost money or a disaster at 
all.  Implementing security controls on a networked environment enables the network 
system to function properly as designed. Because of this, companies, governments 
and other organizations have prioritized network security and spent billions of euros on 
planning and implementing newer technologies. [7,3] 
 
In today’s open environment, organizations who want to provide public access to the 
network resources need to analyse the security threats that might result in an attack to 
the system. At this point, it is worth to reminding that an attack might happen from in-
side the network premises by trusted workers as well. A security analyst is concerned 
about discovering any kinds of vulnerabilities and attacks that might cause threats to 
today’s operation of the system and also to the survival of the organization as well. 
[7,28] 
 
3.2 Vulnerabilities 
 
Vulnerability is a characteristic of a computer or a network system which poses weak-
nesses to the overall security system of a computer or a network that can be exploited 
by a threat. The threat uses the weakness of vulnerability to cause a potential damage 
to the computer or a network system. [8,6]  
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Basically, the vulnerability of a system can be traced back to three main sources: lack 
of effective network security policy, network configuration weaknesses and technology 
weaknesses. 
 
Lack of Effective Network Security Policy 
 
An organization needs to have a written security police document that clearly states 
what to do regarding the security issues that matter most to maintain the desired op-
eration standard of the organization. If a policy is characterized by absence of uniformi-
ty  in the application of polices, absence of continuity in enforcing polices, absence of a 
disaster recovery plan, absence of patch management, absence of log monitoring and 
absence of proper access controls, it will create security holes and make the network 
more vulnerable to an attack. [7,25] 
 
Network Configuration Weaknesses 
 
Humans are prone to comet mistakes in one way or another. Configuration vulnerabili-
ties are human errors caused by lack of knowledge or misunderstanding. Such vulner-
abilities happen when a weak password, misconfigured network devices, misconfigured 
Internet services (HTTP, FTP, Telnet etc.) and default settings are used. Each of them 
contributes a great opportunity for hackers and saboteurs to misuse the network re-
sources. However, it is possible to prevent the damage before-hand by implementing 
standard baseline configurations. [7,26] 
 
Technology Weaknesses 
 
The current time technologies are not perfect to provide products and services we need 
without security holes. Almost all hardware equipment, software products (operating 
systems and applications), protocols (TCP/IP suits and routing protocols) have defects 
that can lead to system vulnerability and make the systems they belong to prone to 
attacks. [8,15]  
 
3.3 Threat 
 
A threat is anything that can be considered a potential cause of event which is capable 
of exploiting the vulnerability of a network system to harm the organization by disrupt-
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ing the designed operation of the network. A threat can be initiated intentionally by 
people or accidentally by natural disasters, by malfunctioning of computers and by sys-
tem components. [8,22] 
 
Generally threats are grouped into two broad categories: structured threats and un-
structured threats. The former type of threats is the most difficult one caused by people 
who are well organized to attempt a planned attack on a targeted system. Basically, the 
people are highly skilled and capable of manipulating the vulnerabilities of the system 
for their own benefit. The latter threats are of the most casual type, and are initiated by 
any person who is cable of identifying system vulnerabilities using freely available In-
ternet scanning tools. For instance, there are free shall-scripts program and password 
crackers used by people to crack or steel a password and access the system to seek 
for any fortunes. Even though the attacks are not in an organized manner like the for-
mer, it is still capable of causing serious damage. [7,30] 
 
3.4 Attack   
 
According to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), “an attack is an assault on 
system security that derives from an intelligent threat, i.e., an intelligent act that is a 
deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security 
services and violate the security policy of a system”. The assault can be any attempt to 
learn or gather information without affecting the system resources (passive attack, like 
packet sniffing) or it might be a serious one targeting resource manipulation and disrup-
tions of  system operation (active attack which include denial of service). Such an at-
tack is initiated either from the inside security perimeters, who are trusted entities (in-
side attack) or from outside security perimeters, who are not authorized to access the 
system (outside attack). [7,13] 
 
Technically speaking, with respect to the goals they accomplish, attacks are grouped 
into three main categories: reconnaissance attacks, access attacks, DoS (Denial-of-
Service) attacks. 
 
Reconnaissance Attack 
 
A reconnaissance attack is concerned in accessing a system for any kind of vulnerabili-
ties to launch attacks on the network system. In this case, the loss is not immediate; 
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however it creates a potential for hackers or intruders to initiate a targeted attack on a 
network system. A reconnaissance attack is usually aimed at discovering DNS (Do-
main Name System) information using DNA lookup queries and “Who is” queries, a 
range of subnets and hosts using Ping sweep software, an open port using port scan-
ner and to examine packet vulnerabilities using packet spoofing. [5,33] 
 
Access Attack  
 
Such type of an attack is targeted to get access to a system or network without legiti-
mate authentication. Intruders use different tools to intercept data traffic and extract 
important information such as password to get access into the system and misuse the 
network resources, modify device configurations and add unauthorized body to the 
system access list. In addition to that, such an attack includes the introduction of fabri-
cated objects usually done by altering the original data, and the injections of malware. 
[7,33] 
 
Computer malware (including viruses, worms, Trojan horses and others) is malicious 
software programs designed purposely to destroy or damage a computer system or 
network resources. Today, a malware developer uses the Internet to spread malicious 
programs to affect as numerous computer systems as possible. Such programs are 
capable of slowing down the Internet, wipe out files, affect servers etc. Even though 
there are a number of malware software programs exiting today, the descriptions of 
each malicious object mentioned above are presented below:  
 
 Virus is a computer program or code fragment that is capable of attaching itself 
to the host program and duplicate whenever the host program is excited. A 
computer virus as a biological virus is not self-propagating. It needs a carrier 
program to spread from one system to another, like email attachments. [8,22] 
 
 Worm is an independent and self-propagating program which is designed to 
scan a network for system vulnerability to duplicate itself and then propagate to 
the next new system. [8,22] 
 
 Trojan horse is a program or pieces of code hiding inside another program to 
disguise a user to accept it as useful application like commercial games. How-
ever, when a program with a Trojan horse is executed it affects the system from 
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miner to total distractions. Some of them are capable of modifying or replacing 
the existing program, create a back door to hackers, modifying  the access list 
and also upgrade the privilege level. [7,34] 
 
It is very important to note that the definitions of Virus, Worm and Trojan horse change 
with their development. For example, a computer virus developer is combining a num-
ber of viruses’ features together to produce a more resilient virus than before. 
 
 
 
Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS attacks) 
 
As the name indicates a Denial-of-Service attack is an attack targeted to prevent ser-
vice access to those individuals who have legal right for it. A system compromised by a 
Denial-of-Service attack executes a code that generates a number of consecutive re-
quests for a service to create a bottle-neck in data transmission line and, as a result of 
this the attack makes the service unavailable to the legitimate users [5, 34]. An attack 
of such a type does not require high level of skill or knowledge; it can be initiated by an 
individual who has basic skill of the subject matter. Ping of death, synchronize Se-
quenced Number (SYN) flooding, spamming, and smurfing are among examples of 
Denial-of-Service attacks. [8,22] 
 
3.5 Risk Analysis 
 
In conducting a risk analysis, first all it is important to understand the basic definition of 
a computer security risk. A security risk is a probability that a particular threat exploits a 
particular vulnerability of a computer system that leads to losses of assets and re-
sources. There are many different threats to a network system, but risk analysts have 
to pay attention to those threats that matter most. At this point, digital log files are the 
best alternatives to start the process of identification of threats; some of them are listed 
below: 
 
 Local installation security system  
 Software venders 
 Local computer records 
 Professional computer security organization 
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 Security newsletter and paper 
 Electronic news group and list  
 Local system users. [10,17;11,31] 
 
The list might be enough to cover the threats facing the network system, but risk ana-
lysts need to widen their horizon to discover organization-specific threats as well.  
 
Conducting a risk analysis primarily involves identification of assets, discovering risks 
to those assets and deploying controls to mitigate those risks. That means, in the pro-
cess it is very important to know what kinds of risks exist to the company resources 
and how those risks be reduced or eventually eliminated. Basically, a security measure 
in a system has to be in proportion to the risks. Technically, implementing a security 
system in a computer network is not an easy task and usually, such a process with 
respect to selecting an appropriate security control is quite subjective. The primary idea 
of performing a risk analysis is to put those processes into an objective basis. [11,31] 
  
There are a number of distinct approaches to a risk analysis. Basically those ap-
proaches are grouped into two categories: quantitative and qualitative risk analysis. 
Both approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages. 
 
3.6 Risk Analysis Methodologies 
 
3.6.1 Quantitative Risk Analysis 
 
Such an approach of risk analysis is usually expressed in monetary value, and basical-
ly it is an estimate value of the probability of an event occurring and the losses it will 
cause. It is the financial loss expectancy that a company encounters at a time of inci-
dence. Mathematically, the quantitative loses for events are calculated on an annual 
basis, simply multiplying the potential loss by the likelihood occurrence of a given 
event. To illustrate it, let us look at a practical example. We suppose the RAM of a 
computer fails two times every three years and the hardware cost of a RAM is €100. 
Based on the assumptions, the probability of a RAM fail a year is 2/3; hence the annual 
loss expectancy will be (2/3)*€100, which is €66,7. [12,4] 
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Theoretically, it is possible to rank an event based on the calculated risk value which 
ultimately helps to make the decision about what manner the security controls are go-
ing to be deployed. However, a quantitative risk analysis is not feasible when we use 
unreliable or inaccurate data. For instance, the implemented control and counter 
measures usually create a number of potential events and those events are mostly 
interrelated to one another. This makes it difficult to know them at hand and make a 
prediction about the likelihood probability of the occurrence of an event difficult. [10,4]  
 
 
 
3.6.2 Qualitative Risk Analysis 
 
In a qualitative risk analysis one does not assign monetary values to a specific risk, but 
rather calculate relative values to estimate the potential losses. The analysis is con-
ducted through questionnaires and collaborative workshops involving workers and 
owners of the company. Risk analysts distribute questionnaires to gather information 
about the company's assets, deployed controls and other relevant security matters. 
The collected information is useful in identifying the assets and estimated values of 
those assets. In the workshop, the participants are tasked in predicting what threats 
each asset may face and finally imagine what types of vulnerabilities those threats 
might exploit in the future. [12,5] 
 
3.7 Security Solution 
 
3.7.1 Security Policy  
 
As discussed in section 3.2, a hierarchical network design has three layers. The first 
one is called the core layer; it is where the critical application and supporting system is 
located and it needs to be protected from attacker by an additional security layer. The 
second layer is called the distribution layer where internal users and mostly public re-
sources are located such as web servers and FTP servers. At the distribution layer one 
may find gateway applications and network systems (such as intrusion detection, virus 
and content inspections), specialized in providing additional security functions needed 
to protect the system from outsider as well insiders. The third layer is the access layer 
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where end users are located to access the network resources and services and this 
layer has to be protected from unauthorized users. 
 
Today no computer system is immune to an attack, and companies need to implement 
effective security measures that are capable of protecting their network system and 
resources. To confront an attack coming from inside or outside the company's network 
administrators need to choose adequate security technologies and their placement in 
the network system. Today there are numerous security technologies available but the 
choice and deployment has to match to the overall company’s goal and security policy. 
[13,8] 
 
Companies make security-related decision based on their own security goals, which 
are basically related to the business opportunities which their operation is based. The 
security goals of the company need to be known to users and employees of the firm 
through a set of security rules called security policy. According to the Request for 
Comments (RFC) 2196, a security policy is a formal statement of rules by which people 
that are given access to an organization's technology and information must abide. The 
policy has to state clearly everyone’s requirements for protecting the company's tech-
nology and information assets, and also need to dictate the procedure of how the re-
quirements be met. [13,5] 
 
Before developing a security policy it is necessary to develop a security plan that de-
cides what needs to be protected and from whom. The best way to do it is by conduct-
ing a risk analysis to list out what are considered allowable and non-allowable actions 
and beyond that to determine where and how security issues are addressed .A well-
organized security policy includes user access policy, remote access policy, accounta-
bility policy, authentication policy, incident handling policy, Internet access policy, E-
mail policy, physical security policy, maintenance policy and violation reporting policy. 
[14,6]  
 
Generally, a policy should not be over-restrictive but rather ease the use of resources 
with a certain level of restrictions. The depth of our security policy based on how much 
we trust people, and the policy has to draw a line to balance between allowing users to 
access company resources to do their jobs and completely denying access to those 
resources and assets. Usually, network administrators together with senior managers 
of the company are responsible for designing the security policy. Inputs from users, 
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staff, managers, network administrators and designers are required to develop an ef-
fective security policy. Besides that, it is absolutely necessary to seek legal counsel 
before communicating with users and staff of the company and asking them to abide by 
the rules of the policy documents. [14,7] 
 
Since companies are in a constant change with respect to technology and business 
directions, and also risks to the company’s resources and assets changes over time. 
Hence, the security policy documents needs to be reviewed on a regular basis to sup-
port the security needs. According to Cisco security experts, maintaining the security of 
the company is a non-ending process and puts it in to four stage of a vicious cycle 
called security wheel. The stages are: implementing, monitoring, testing and improving. 
After the policy is implemented it needs to be monitored against attacks and then ap-
propriate security measures have to be tested before applying the improved security 
measures. [1,237] 
 
It might be important to consider exceptions to every rule, and the policy document 
needs to include those exceptions if they exist. Most often, system administrators might 
use the same user id and usually they need to have the right to access administrative 
files to go through a user's files whenever it is necessary.  
 
3.7.2 Security Technologies and Their Placement 
 
Modern network communication and sharing systems requires the deployments of effi-
cient security system that fit with the overall security policy of the company which is 
capable of protecting the network's assets and resources. Today there are number of 
technologies available to be used to build a security system, but the biggest challenge 
to a network administrator is to select the most adequate technology and to decide 
where the right place would be to deploy it in the network system. Figure 3 below 
shows the choices of technologies and their placement in the security zone. [16,195] 
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Figure 3. Placement of Security Measures on Security Zone. Copied from Canavan. (2001)[8] 
 
An Unauthorized remote access to a network resource is protected by deploying re-
mote access authentication technologies such as RADIUS (to protect dial-up connec-
tions), encryption (to protect leased line connections) and IPsec to protect connection 
over a public network. Distribution layer devices are usually protected by deploying one 
or more firewalls as well as a security zone. [16,195] 
 
 After a user has been identified and authorized to access the network resources, it is 
important to check the inbound as well as the outbound data for harmful objects such 
as viruses that affects the normal function of a computer system. Practically it can be 
done by deploying content inspection, intrusion detection, anti-virus or PKI (Pre-shared 
key Information). Finally the system that provides the application service is also needed 
to protect using access control lists (ACLs), data encryption and anti-virus programs. 
 
3.7.3 Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) 
 
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is an open standard security framework developed by 
IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) to provide secure communications over IP 
networks. That means IPsec offers protection for higher layer protocols and applica-
tions that makes it to be the most preferred technology used to secure end-to-end 
communication over the IP network. Basically, IPsec is designed to offer confidentiality, 
integrity and authenticity of data communications and devices interoperability. IPsec 
Policy Management 
Remote Access 
Authentication 
Firewall, VPN    
PKI 
Content Inspection  
Intrusion Detection 
Anti-Virus, PKI 
PKI, SSL, VPN 
 
PKI ,ACls  
Anti-Virus,  
Local Encryption 
Access  Network 
Validity 
Perimeter  Network 
Validity 
Data  Validity 
User  Validity 
System  Validity 
20 
 
accomplishes those tasks through two protocols called Authentication Header (AH) and 
the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) along with standard key negotiation and 
management mechanisms. [9,189;15,5] 
 
 The Authentication Header (AH), is designed to provide data integrity (original authen-
tication) for the whole IP datagram and hence it is an effective measure against IP 
spoofing and session hijacking. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), is designed to 
offer data integrity and confidentiality by encrypting the payload of the IP packets using 
a shared secret key. [15,201,202] 
 
In addition to AH and ESP,  the IPsec suite contains Internet Key Exchange (IKE)  that 
work with Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)/Oakley to 
manage the generation and handling of keys and also it helps to create security asso-
ciations (SA). A security association is a policy or rules agreed between peer devices 
concerning how data exchange takes place among them. Besides that, IPsec has two 
modes of operation: tunnel mode and transport mode. In the tunnel mode, IPsec is 
implemented between two gateways and the original IP packet is encrypted and be-
comes the payload of the new IP packet. In the transport mode IPsec is used between 
hosts and in this case the original header information (source and destination) is unen-
crypted and it makes it to be visible to intermediate network devices. [15,201,202] 
 
3.7.4 Firewall 
 
Firewalls are either hardware or software based and their main function is to keep a 
computer or network system secure from an attack. If we look closer, a hardware-
based firewall is a dedicated device with its own operating system on a specialized 
platform, whereas a software-based firewall is an additional program loaded on a per-
sonal computer or on a network device like a router to inspect data or network traffic.  
 
A firewall has a great role in the implementation of a company’s security policy and in 
this case it is considered a system or a group of systems used to control network traffic 
based on the rules. The firewall is used as a protective bridge that demarks the internal 
or trusted network to the external untrusted network such as the Internet. As a check 
point gateway, firewall analyses the IP packets and decides whether to allow through 
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or not, based on the preconfigured rules. Also the firewall determines which information 
or services to be accessed from outside as well as from inside and by whom. [15,206] 
 
According to cisco, the firewall is helpful for packet inspection, security policy imple-
mentation, generation of the audit system and log messages. To operate as desired, 
the firewall uses one or more of the following technology components: packet-filtering, 
application level gateway (proxy server) and circuit level gateway (SOCKS). Each of 
them has different functions and are explained below: [13, 210,211, 219] 
 
 The Packet-filtering components help to limit the flow of information between 
networks based on the security policy. The Packet-filtering technology uses an 
access control list to permit or deny traffic fulfilling the rules dictated by the se-
curity policy. 
 
 The Application level gateway (proxy server) controls the exchange of data be-
tween two networks at the application level. This is done by inspecting a data 
packet at a higher level of the OSI layers (layer 4, 5, 6 and 7) to control or filter 
out the content of a particular service according to the security policy.  
 
 The Circuit level gateway (SOCKS) is a special kind of application level gate-
way, which is designed to examine both TCP/IP and UDP applications without 
any extra packet processing and filtering. SOCKS is usually used for outbound 
connections whereas a proxy server is used for both inbound and outbound 
connections. 
 
To build an effective firewall those components are used together, but depending on 
the requirements one or more combinations of the components can be used. Even 
though the firewall is designed to permit or deny a vulnerable service to protect the 
internal network from external attacks, it is the duty of the network administrator to ex-
amine user logs and alarms generated by the firewall and update the security policy as 
soon as possible. 
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3.7.5 Physical Security 
 
Physical access to the network facilities has to be monitored and protected in order to 
avoid unauthorized access, theft, vandalism and misuse of a company’s resources and 
assets. Only the right personnel are needed to be allowed to physically access the 
network equipment to perform their jobs. This is usually done by keeping the critical 
network equipment behind locked door, which has protections from natural disasters 
such as floods, fires, storms, and earthquakes, as well as human disasters like terror-
ists, hackers and competitors. In a computer room the network equipment should be 
kept in a rack that is attached to the floor or wall and the room needs to be equipped 
with uninterruptible power supplies, air-conditioning, fire alarms, fire-abatement mech-
anisms and water removal systems. [1,238] 
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4  Research Project and Project Implementation 
  
4.1    Project Analysis 
 
Basically a project analysis includes planning, designing and controlling of a network 
project. This project focus is on building a local area network for a small company and 
to apply the security measures to ensure the safety of the network resources and ser-
vices of a company. The plan of this project is to build a simulation network for a small 
company in the laboratory network, which consists of one Cisco ASA 5505 firewall as a 
getaway router, one Cisco 3560 switch as a core switch, two Cisco 2960 switch as 
workstation switches and workstations. 
 
 A computer network is built in the company premises primarily to create a communica-
tion channel between users within company to share network resources and services 
including Internet access safely and easily. Those characteristics are valuable to in-
crease the efficiency of the worker as well as the overall productivity of the company by 
making resources and services available to users easily whenever needed. That 
means, building a computer network in a company reduces the time and money spent 
to get resources and information needed in the traditional manner. 
 
 The simulated network is intended to create a communication channel and also to pro-
vide file sharing service to the public users with higher security measures. Companies 
and organizations might need to communicate the public for various reasons. To do so 
most often they build a web site and make their resources and services available for 
public usage. Therefore, the project network is employed to offer file sharing service to 
internal user as well as to the public. This is accomplished by dedicating an FTP server 
to offer file sharing service for those requisites coming from inside and outside the net-
work.  
 
A simulated network is also designed to offer a wireless connection to visitors and au-
thenticated users as well. The wireless network helps users to be connected to the 
network and share resources and services at any place within the radio signal radius. 
Besides that, the simulated network provides remote access to the network through 
VPN tunnelling over public Internet. A remote client connection helps authorized users 
to be connected to the network system as if they were located inside the network prem-
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ises. Users are able to access the network resources wherever they are as long as 
they are connected to the Internet. 
 
4.2 Project Design 
 
4.2.1 Topology Design and Implementation 
 
The project topology shown in figure 4 below is designed by considering the character-
istics and features of a small company. The topology is assumed to have three de-
partments with the possible future expansion and planned to offer flexible, reliable, se-
cure and fast network services. It is designed to have seven subnets, two of which are 
workgroup subnets where employees are located, and one subnet is for the network 
management team, two subnets are for DMZ and internal servers and the remaining 
two subnets are for a wireless network.  
 
 
   Figure 4. Simulated LAN Network. 
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The topology presented in figure 4 is an extended star topology where a CSW switch is 
used as a core switch to centralize all connections going to workstation switches (SW1 
and SW2), firewall (ASA) and access point (AP). The extended star topology guaran-
tees the system for future expansions in size whenever the need comes. The network 
devices are connected to one another using Cat 5 (Unshielded Twisted Pair) cables 
and RJ-45 connecters.  
 
According to figure 4, the firewall is a gateway to the external network by routing IP 
traffic in both directions. The firewall is connected to the Internet through test network 
with a dedicated IP address. A public server is connected to the firewall with its own 
subnet which is basically planned to offer file sharing services to public users. The fire-
wall is used to translate the private IP addresses of the inside and Public_Server sub-
nets to a public IP address of the outside interface of the firewall and vice versa.  
Above all, the main task of the firewall is to serve as a check point to filter out incoming 
and outgoing traffics for the purpose of protection of the internal network against at-
tacks coming from the external network. 
 
 Access layer switches (Sw1 and Sw2) shown in the topology figure 4 are used to con-
nect workstations and the internal server to the core switch. Workgroup1 subnet and 
management subnet are connected to Sw1 switch, and workgroup2 subnet and Serv-
er_Farm subnet are connected to Sw2 switch. Workgroup1 and workgroup2 subnets 
are dedicated to employees, and users in those subnets are allowed to communicate 
with each other and to the external world through the Internet. The management sub-
net is dedicated for network administration and management purposes and the Serv-
er_Farm subnet is configured to provide file sharing services to the internal user only. 
 
The access point (AP) shown in figure 4 is directly connected to the core switch (CSW) 
and is configured to provide a wireless connection to visitors and authenticated users 
within the radio signal range.  
 
4.2.2 IP Addressing 
 
 An IP address is a unique 32- bit number which is used to identify a network device on 
an IP network. Each IP address consists of two parts, the host and the network portion. 
The network address is used for identifying the network or the subnet where the device 
is located and the host address helps to identify the individual device.[16,254] 
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In the simulated network a private IP address 192.168.0.0/24 was used for the internal 
network subnets and a public IP address 192.94.62.251/24 was used for the outside 
virtual interface (VLAN2) of the firewall. The VLAN configuration and IP addressing for 
the firewall (ASA) are presented below. 
 
interface Vlan1 
 nameif inside 
 security-level 100 
 ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Vlan2 
 nameif outside 
 security-level 0 
 ip address 10.94.62.251 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Vlan3 
 no forward interface Vlan1 
 nameif dmz 
 security-level 70 
 ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 
 
Listing 1. VLAN configuration on firewall 
 
As listing 1 illustrates, IP address 192.168.1.1/24 is assigned to the VLAN1 of the fire-
wall (inside VLAN) and the 192.1168.2.1/24 is to VLAN3 of the firewall (dmz VLAN). 
Besides that, according to appendix 1, subnet 192.168.30.0/24 and subnet 
192.168.40.0/24 are assigned to the wireless network, subnet 192.168.50.0/24 and 
subnet 192.168.60.0/24 are assigned to VLAN40 and VLAN50 (workgroup1 and work-
station2 VLANs), subnet 192.168.100.0/24 assigned to VLAN100 (management 
VLAN), and subnets 192.168.70.0/24 and 172.16.10.8/28 are assigned to VLAN70 
(Server_Farm VLAN) and to remote clients respectively. The full configuration is pro-
vided in appendixes 1,2,3,4 and 5 
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The firewall (ASA) is also configured to assign a dynamic IP address to remote client 
who requests for an VPN connection over the Internet. The DHCP pool on the firewall 
has been configured as follows: 
 
ip local pool remote-access 172.16.10.10-172.16.10.15 mask 
255.255.255.128 
 
According to the above configuration, there are five IP addresses in the address pool, 
and the firewall (which is a DHCP server for remote clients) is capable of assigning up 
to five IP addresses to a remote device at the sametime. The rest of the configuration 
is given in appendix 1. 
 
In addition to that, the core switch (CSW) has been configured for the DHCP server to 
assign IP addresses dynamically to wireless users. The configuration for the address 
pools and their default getaways on the core switch (CSW) are presented below:  
 
ip dhcp excluded-address 192.168.30.1 
ip dhcp excluded-address 192.168.40.1 
! 
ip dhcp pool AP_pool_Guest 
   network 192.168.30.0 255.255.255.0 
   default-router 192.168.30.1 
! 
ip dhcp pool AP_pool_Worker 
   network 192.168.40.0 255.255.255.0 
   default-router 192.168.40.1 
 
The configuration above is meant to create two IP address pools, namely 
AP_pool_Guest and AP_pool_Worker. AP_pool_Guest is a pool of IP addresses of 
a subnet 192.168.30.0/24 that is assigned to the Guest VLAN (VLAN30) and the 
AP_pool_Worker is an IP addresses pool of a subnet 192.168.40.0/24 which belongs 
to the Worker VLAN (VLAN40). The default gateways (192.168.30.1 and 192.168.40.1) 
are excluded from pools to avoid address overlap. The rest of the configuration is pre-
sented in appendixes 2 and 4. 
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As stated in section 4.2.2, the inside network uses private IP addresses to identify a 
network as well as a network device. Private IP addresses are used for intranet con-
nection and they are not routable over the gateway. To make the private IP addresses 
routable it is necessary to use the NAT (IP Network Address Translation) technology. 
Basically, NAT is used for translation of a real address (private address) of a device 
into a mapped address (public address) to be routable over networks.[15]  In the simu-
lated network project, the firewall ASA is configured to be a NAT server and some of 
the configuration is shown below. 
 
object network inside-outside 
 subnet 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 
nat (inside,outside) dynamic interface 
 
It is important to note that, on the Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5505 ver-
sion 8.3 and later, the NAT configuration requires creating a network object which con-
tains a private IP address for a host or a subnet and defines the NAT rule to be fol-
lowed. In the above NAT configuration, an object inside-outside is defined an inside 
subnet 192.168.0.0/16 and with a NAT rule that dynamically assign the ASA outside 
interface IP address (10.94.62.251/24) to the internal subnet to connect to the Internet. 
This and other configuration presented in appendix 1 help to create a working connec-
tion to the Internet.  Example 1 below shows the output of NAT translations. 
 
Example 1: NAT translation. 
 
ASA# show xlate 
17 in use, 118 most used 
Flags: D - DNS, i - dynamic, r - portmap, s - static, 
I - identity, T – twice, e - extended 
NAT from inside:192.168.1.0/24 to out-
side:192.168.1.0/24 
    flags sI idle 1:15:20 timeout 0:00:00 
TCP PAT from dmz:192.168.2.3 21-21 to out-
side:10.94.62.251 21-21 
    flags sr idle 0:25:07 timeout 0:00:00 
TCP PAT from dmz:192.168.2.0/24 21-21 to out-
side:10.94.62.251 21-21 
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flags sr idle 0:25:07 timeout 0:00:00 
UDP PAT from inside:192.168.100.4/64375 to out-
side:10.94.62.251/64375 flags ri idle 0:00:55 timeout 
0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.30.2/50531 to out-
side:10.94.62.251/50531 flags ri idle 0:00:18 timeout 
0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.30.2/50530 to out-
side:10.94.62.251/50530 flags ri idle 0:00:18 timeout 
0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.30.2/50529 to out-
side:10.94.62.251/50529 flags ri idle 0:00:18 timeout 
0:00:30 
 
The output presented in example 1 shows, clients from dmz and inside networks are 
able to connect to the outside network through the ASA outside interface IP address 
10.94.62.251. That means the NAT rule translates the private IP addresses of the in-
ternal networks into a public IP address that is routable on the networks.  
 
4.3 Security Desigin and Implementation 
 
4.3.1 Basic Configuration  of Network Devices 
 
For the sake of growth and well-being, owners as well as managers of a company need 
to pay special attention to the security system of their computer network. Network se-
curity is concerned with the protection of network resources and services from natural 
and human caused disasters. To do so, the security designer has to look carefully at 
the vulnerability of the network system and design security measures to protect disas-
ter on the company.  
 
All network devices used in the simulated lab have been configured with a basic con-
figuration. The basic configuration includes the names of the devices, the IP addresses 
of the interfaces and VLANs, user names and their encrypted passwords, VTY and 
console ports passwords, default routes, access and trunk ports, banners of the day 
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and domain names. Some basic configuration of the core switch (CSW) are shown 
below. 
 
hostname CSW 
! 
enable secret 5 $1$Nh/1$bmSgITR31VtxLu.4mc7Wo. 
! 
ip routing 
! 
 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 description "to the ASA device" 
 no switchport 
 ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 
! 
access-list 1 permit 192.168.100.0 
banner motd ^C unauthorized user is not prohibited ^C 
! 
line con 0 
 access-class 1 in 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 06120E2C495A081400 
 logging synchronous 
 login 
line vty 0 4 
 access-class 1 in 
 exec-timeout 5 0 
 privilege level 15 
 password 7 06120E2C495A081400 
 logging synchronous 
 login local 
 transport input ssh 
line vty 5 15 
 no login 
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As stated above, the core switch named CSW configured for a secret privilege mode 
password, banner of the day, VTY and console port access passwords. A secured re-
mote communication protocol SSH (Secure Shell) has been configured on VTY port 
and the access has been protected by a standard access list 1. Besides that, the core 
switch is configured by the command ip routing to perform a routing task for the inside 
subnets. Also, in order to create layer 3 connection between the firewall and CSW Fast 
Ethernet 0/1 of the CSW is needed to be configured as a routing port with no 
switchport command and assigned to an IP address 192.168.1.2/24. This and other 
configurations presented in appendix 2, 3 and 4 help to create a working network con-
nection as shown in appendix 5. Examples 2 and 3 present the ip route learnt by the 
core switch and by the firewall. 
 
Example 2. The ip route table of firewall (ASA). 
 
ASA# show route 
 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, 
B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter 
area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external 
type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - 
EGP 
       i - IS-IS, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2, ia - 
IS-IS inter area 
       * - candidate default, U - per-user static route, o - ODR 
       P - periodic downloaded static route 
 
 
Gateway of last resort is 10.94.62.254 to network 0.0.0.0 
 
S    192.168.30.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
S    192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
S    192.168.40.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
S    172.16.10.10 255.255.255.255 [1/0] via 10.94.62.118, out-
side 
C    10.94.62.0 255.255.255.0 is directly connected, outside 
S    192.168.50.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
C    192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 is directly connected, inside 
C    192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 is directly connected, dmz 
S    192.168.70.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
S    192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
S*   0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 [1/0] via 10.94.62.254, outside 
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Example 3. The ip route table of the core switch (CSW). 
 
CSW#show ip route 
Codes: L - local, C - connected, S - static, R - RIP, M - mo-
bile, B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter 
area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external 
type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2 
       i - IS-IS, su - IS-IS summary, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - 
IS-IS level-2 
       ia - IS-IS inter area, * - candidate default, U - per-
user static route 
       o - ODR, P - periodic downloaded static route, H - NHRP, 
l - LISP 
       + - replicated route, % - next hop override 
 
Gateway of last resort is 192.168.1.1 to network 0.0.0.0 
 
S*    0.0.0.0/0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.1 
      192.168.1.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.1.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/1 
L        192.168.1.2/32 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/1 
      192.168.30.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.30.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan30 
L        192.168.30.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan30 
      192.168.40.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.40.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan40 
L        192.168.40.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan40 
      192.168.50.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.50.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan50 
L        192.168.50.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan50 
      192.168.60.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.60.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan60 
L        192.168.60.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan60 
      192.168.70.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.70.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan70 
L        192.168.70.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan70 
      192.168.100.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.100.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan100 
L        192.168.100.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan100 
 
 
Example 4 below shows the ping result between the ASA firewall and the management 
workstation. 
 
Example 4: Connectivity testing 
 
ASA# ping 192.168.100.4 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
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Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.100.4, timeout is 2 
seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 
1/1/1 ms 
 
Examples 2 and 3 presents subnets that are reachable from or through the CSW core 
switch as well as the ASA firewall. The gateway of last resorts and default routes were 
configured to route unknown subnets traffics to outside network (that is in the case of 
the ASA firewall) and to the inside network (in the case of CSW switch).  And, example 
4 illustrates the connectivity between the management workstation and the ASA fire-
wall.    
 
4.3.2 Securing the Inside Network Using Firewall  
 
As discussed in section 4.2.1, for this project a Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance 
(ASA 5505) were used as a firewall to protect an attack coming from the outside net-
work to the inside network. ASA 5505 is a full-featured security appliance capable of 
offering a high-performance firewall, SSL and IPsec VPN, and many other network 
services for small and medium-sized company networks. ASA 5505 has a flexible 
eight-port 10/100 Fast Ethernet switch and is capable of supporting up to three VLANs 
in the security plus license. [15,72]. In the simulated network of this project three 
VLANs were created: Inside, Outside and dmz VLANs. The Inside VLAN is a trust net-
work assigned to the inside network and is connected to E2 Fast Ethernet interface of 
the ASA 5505 firewall. The Outside VLAN is the most untrusted network (public net-
work) and is connected to the E0 Fast Ethernet interface of the ASA 5505 firewall, and 
dmz VLAN is a security zone containing a public server and is connected to the E4 
Fast Ethernet interface of the ASA 5505 firewall.   
 
Basically, each interface of the ASA 5505 needs to be assigned a security level be-
tween 0 and 100, as shown in appendix 1. The inside interface is assigned to a security 
level of 100, the outside interface to 0 and the dmz interface to 70. A security-level pri-
oritize the follows of network traffics by applying an implicit permit from a higher securi-
ty interface to a lower security interface. That means, the host from a higher security-
level interface can access any host on a lower security-level interface but not the other 
way round. 
34 
 
 
In order to permit the outside hosts to access the FTP server, a network object and an 
access list is required to be configured to direct the traffic flows against the security 
level. In the simulated network, a network object dmz-server-fromoutside was config-
ured along with an extended access list outsidetoDMZ to direct FTP traffic from out-
side to DMZ VLAN. 
 
object network dmz-server-fromoutside 
 host 192.168.2.3 
nat (dmz,outside) dynamic interface  service tcp ftp ftp 
 
access-list outsidetoDMZ extended permit tcp any host 
192.168.2.3 eq ftp 
access-group outsidetoDMZ in interface outside 
 
As shown above a network object dmz-server-fromoutside was created to contain the 
FTP server IP address and the rule was defined to NAT dynamically using the outside 
IP address 10.94.62.251 for any ftp connection attempt made from the outside network. 
The extended access list was also needed to be applied on the outside interface so 
that the outside network of lower security-level could reach to a higher security-level 
FTP-server inside the dmz VLAN.  
 
 In the same way the ASA 5505 firewall was configured for the DMZ host to access the 
inside server as well as the inside network hosts to access the DMZ host. The full con-
figuration and a NAT translation is found in appendixes 1 and 5.  
 
4.3.3 Securing Switch 
 
According to the network topology shown in figure 4, the internal network is segmented 
into subnets based on the function. The core switch CSW is configured to play a role of 
routing IP traffics to individual segments. Each subnet is a broadcasting domain and 
this helps to enhance the security of the system by preventing sniffing and ARP (Ad-
dress Resolution Protocol)attacks between segments [16]. 
 
Switch’s ports are gateways to a network system and they need to be protected from 
strangers. To do so, port security has to be tight and the unused ports have to be moni-
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tored regularly and are need to make sure they are shutdown. In the simulated network 
of this project all unused ports has been shutdown and besides that, to protect the sys-
tem against MAC flooding and spoofing attack port security was configured on VLAN 
50, 60, 70, and 100 ports. To enable port security on the access port, the switchport 
port-security command was used on each access ports of the network system. As an 
example a configuration for switch Sw2’s access port FastEthernet0/10 is shown be-
low. 
 
Sw2(config)# interface fastethernet 0/10 
Sw2 (config-if)# switchport port-security 
Sw2 (config-if)#spanning-tree portfast 
Sw2 (config-if)#spanning-tree bpduguard enable 
 
Issuing switchport port-security on the access port set the maximum number of MAC 
address assigned to fastethernet 0/10 port to 1 and the violation rule to shut down. And 
BPDU (Bridge Protocol Data Unit) is also enabled on a portfast-enabled port using the 
spanning-tree portfast bpduguard default command on configuration mode. This 
command helps to prevent the desperation of the root bridge function, which is a poten-
tial cause of the Denial of Service attacks.  
 
Moreover a management VLAN 100, was assigned to isolate management traffic from 
the production by assigning each device to the management VLAN.  Also the man-
agement traffic was encrypted via SSH (Secure Shell) protocol. The entire configura-
tion is found in appendixes 2, 3 and 4. 
4.3.4 Securing Remote Client Access  
 
The simulated network was been configured for a VPN remote access to allow privi-
leged users to access the network over the Internet. In such a configuration, before 
IPsec VPN association was formed a VPN tunnel was created between the remote 
client and the ASA 5505 firewall over the public Internet and then they negotiate how to 
build an IPsec security association. To incorporate a remote accessing technology to 
the simulated network, a VPN connection configuration was done using the web-based 
GUI (Graphical User Interface) management software ASDM (Adaptive Security Device 
Manager). The ASDM configuration steps for a remote VPN client connection on ASA 
5505 are presented as follows: 
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1. On the management host, open an Internet explorer and type https:192.168.1.1 
on the address bar. 
2. On the Cisco ASDM page, select wizard on the menu bar and select IPsec VPN 
wizard and select remote access radio button and then click next. 
3. On the client type page, select Cisco VPN client and then click next. 
4. On the client authentication page, select pre-shared key and type the key then 
type the tunnel group. (tametame is used for pre-shared key and testgroup for 
tunnel group) and then click next. 
5. Select the authentication on the local user database and then click next. 
6. On the user account page, create users with usernames and passwords (tame, 
tame1 with passwords tametame, tametame1 were used) and then click next. 
7. On the address pool page, create a pool of addresses used to be assign to re-
mote clients (a pool of 172.16.10.10-172.16.10.15 were used) and then click 
next. 
8. Type DNS sever in the primary DNS Server (the test network DNS server is 
used) and then click next. 
9. Define the encryption, authentication and Diffie-Hellman group policy and click. 
10. Select the inside network to be hide from outside user and select enable split 
tunnelling and then click next. 
11. Finish. 
 
The above configuration was made using the ASA version 8.3(4) and ASDM 6.4 and 
those steps might not be consistent with other versions. 
 
On the client device after installing VPN client software the configuration were done as 
follows: 
 
1. Open the VPN client software on the remote client device. 
2. Click on new button. 
3. On VPN client properties window, type a name on connection entry (like re-
mote-connection), type the public IP address (ASA outside interface IP address 
10.94.62.251).  
4. On authentication tab, type the tunnel group name used in configuring VPN on 
ASA (testgroup), enter the pre-shared key in the password box and confirm it 
(tametame). 
5. Save the configuration. 
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Whenever the client wants to connect to the network remotely, the only task the user 
does is to plug himself in to the Internet, open VPN client software, select the connec-
tion enter name and then press the connect button on the menu bar. Figure 5 below 
shows a screen shoot of the VPN client desktop while the client is connected to the 
simulated network through the test network.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Remote Client VPN Connection.  
 
 Figure 5 shows that, a remote client was been assigned an IP address 172.16.10.10 
and is able to surf on the Internet as well as get connected to the test network. The full 
configuration and other testing outputs are presented in appendixes 1 and 5. 
 
4.3.5 Securing the Wireless Connection 
 
In a simulated network of this project, the wireless network was been implemented and 
configured for the WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) encryption technology to protect a 
network eavesdropping attack. WEP is widely supported in wireless devices and the 
VPN technology was deployed for the company users to provide additional security 
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over a wireless connection. As figure 4 shows, the wireless network of this project has 
two VLANs, the Guest VLAN (VLAN30) for visitor and the Worker VLAN (VLAN40) for 
employees. Both VLANs were configured for open authentication and the WEP encryp-
tion technology. The WEP encryption configuration for VLAN30 and VLAN40 on a wire-
less access point (AP) was done as follows: 
 
AP(config)#interface dot11radio 0 
AP(config-if)#encryption vlan 30 key 3 size 128 
12345678901234567890123456 transmit-key 
AP(config-ssid)#end 
 
AP(config)#interface dot11radio 0 
AP(config-if)#encryption vlan 40 key 3 size 128 
98765432109876543210123456 transmit-key 
AP(config-ssid)#end 
  
The above configuration is meant for encrypted data communication between the ac-
cess point (AP) and the wireless user with a transmittable 128-bite WEP encryption key 
at slot 3. Figure 6 below shows a screen shoot of a wireless connection using Worker 
SSID.  
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Wireless Connection 
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As figure 6 shows, the client device was assigned an IP address 192.168.40.2/24 from 
the Worker subnet and is connected to the simulated network successfully. The yellow 
closed key icon at the bottom right side of figure 6 represent a VPN connection and 
that means, a wireless data connection between the client and the access point is 
made through well secured VPN tunnel. The VPN connection here provides additional 
protection for the wireless commination between the client and the access point. Be-
sides that, the above client is also connected to the Internet by using the DNS sever in 
the test network. The full configuration and testing outputs are presented in appendixes 
1 and 5. 
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5 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
At the present time, company’s owners and network administrators are engaged in 
protecting their resources and assets by prioritizing the deployment of security 
measures before offering any kind of network-based services. To build a secure net-
work system, a network administrator needs to select the right kind of technology that 
fit with the company’s goal and security demands. The purpose of this project were to 
study the susceptibility of small company network system and build a secure Local Ar-
ea Network system in the laboratory and recommend the best practice presented to-
day. 
 
An attack to a computer system might happen at any time from anywhere and hence 
securing a computer and a network system of a company is left without choice. Build-
ing a security layer on a network system of a company costs money and time, but it is 
worth it, considering the losses and damages occurring without it. Protection of a com-
pany’s network assets require developing a security plan and policy that decide what 
needs to be protected and from whom and then implementing the right security 
measures to stop the losses. The system needs to be monitored continuously for the 
threat and attacks coming from the inside and outside a network system targeting the 
company’s resources of any kind. 
 
This study found out that no company’s network system is immune from an attack and 
identified the source of the vulnerabilities of the system to be lack of security policy, 
and configuration and technology weakness. In order to avoid the occurrences of such 
problems on a small company’s network system, a demonstration of the basic network 
devices configuration, layer 2 and 3 security features implementation, firewall deploy-
ment, wireless data encryption, secure wireless access for company users through a 
VPN connection and remote client VPN connection implementation were deployed on a 
simulated Local Area Network in the test network. The security system built was tested 
and found to be working very well and security-tight to protect a small company’s net-
work system and resource from internal and external attacks. 
 
 As the network grows in size a user authentication at the local database is not efficient 
and here by, I recommend to anyone who is interested in studying the subject further in 
the future to enhance the security system of the project by incorporating RADUS-based 
authentication and explore advance encryption methods for wireless network.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1:   Firewall Configuration 
 
ASA# show running-config 
: Saved 
:  
ASA Version 8.4(4)1 
! 
hostname ASA 
enable password i0kMXuCr6vRaByXN encrypted 
passwd 2KFQnbNIdI.2KYOU encrypted 
names 
! 
interface Ethernet0/0 
 switchport access vlan 2 
! 
interface Ethernet0/1 
! 
interface Ethernet0/2 
! 
interface Ethernet0/3 
! 
interface Ethernet0/4 
 switchport access vlan 3 
! 
interface Ethernet0/5 
! 
interface Ethernet0/6 
! 
interface Ethernet0/7 
! 
interface Vlan1 
 nameif inside 
 security-level 100 
 ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Vlan2 
 nameif outside 
 security-level 0 
 ip address 10.94.62.251 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Vlan3 
 no forward interface Vlan1 
 nameif dmz 
 security-level 70 
 ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
banner motd # unautherized user is not prohibited # 
ftp mode passive 
object network inside-outside 
 subnet 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 
object network dmz-outsdie 
 host 192.168.2.3 
object network dmz-server-frominside 
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 subnet 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 
object network dmz-server-fromoutside 
 host 192.168.2.3 
object network int-server 
 host 192.168.70.3 
object network NETWORK_OBJ_172.16.10.8_29 
 subnet 172.16.10.8 255.255.255.248 
object network NETWORK_OBJ_192.168.1.0_24 
 subnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 
access-list outsidetoDMZ extended permit tcp any host 192.168.2.3 eq 
ftp 
access-list internal-server extended permit tcp any object int-server 
eq ftp 
access-list testgroup_splitTunnelAcl standard permit 192.168.1.0 
255.255.255.0 
pager lines 24 
logging asdm informational 
mtu inside 1500 
mtu outside 1500 
mtu dmz 1500 
ip local pool remotepool 172.16.10.10-172.16.10.15 mask 
255.255.255.128 
icmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1 
no asdm history enable 
arp timeout 14400 
nat (inside,outside) source static NETWORK_OBJ_192.168.1.0_24 NET-
WORK_OBJ_192.168.1.0_24 destination static NETWORK_OBJ_172.16.10.8_29 
NETWORK_OBJ_172.16.10.8_29 no-proxy-arp route-lookup 
! 
object network inside-outside 
 nat (inside,outside) dynamic interface 
object network dmz-outsdie 
 nat (dmz,outside) dynamic interface 
object network dmz-server-frominside 
 nat (dmz,outside) static interface service tcp ftp ftp 
object network dmz-server-fromoutside 
 nat (dmz,outside) static interface service tcp ftp ftp 
access-group outsidetoDMZ in interface outside 
access-group internal-server in interface dmz 
route outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 10.94.62.254 1 
route inside 192.168.30.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 
route inside 192.168.40.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 
route inside 192.168.50.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 
route inside 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 
route inside 192.168.70.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 
route inside 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 
timeout xlate 3:00:00 
timeout pat-xlate 0:00:30 
timeout conn 1:00:00 half-closed 0:10:00 udp 0:02:00 icmp 0:00:02 
timeout sunrpc 0:10:00 h323 0:05:00 h225 1:00:00 mgcp 0:05:00 mgcp-pat 
0:05:00 
timeout sip 0:30:00 sip_media 0:02:00 sip-invite 0:03:00 sip-
disconnect 0:02:00 
timeout sip-provisional-media 0:02:00 uauth 0:05:00 absolute 
timeout tcp-proxy-reassembly 0:01:00 
timeout floating-conn 0:00:00 
dynamic-access-policy-record DfltAccessPolicy 
user-identity default-domain LOCAL 
aaa authorization exec authentication-server 
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http server enable 
http 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 inside 
no snmp-server location 
no snmp-server contact 
snmp-server enable traps snmp authentication linkup linkdown coldstart 
warmstart 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-256-MD5 esp-aes-256 esp-md5-
hmac 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-DES-SHA esp-des esp-sha-hmac 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-3DES-SHA esp-3des esp-sha-hmac 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-DES-MD5 esp-des esp-md5-hmac 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-192-MD5 esp-aes-192 esp-md5-
hmac 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-3DES-MD5 esp-3des esp-md5-hmac 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-256-SHA esp-aes-256 esp-sha-
hmac 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-128-SHA esp-aes esp-sha-hmac 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-192-SHA esp-aes-192 esp-sha-
hmac 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-128-MD5 esp-aes esp-md5-hmac 
crypto dynamic-map SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAP 65535 set pfs group1 
crypto dynamic-map SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAP 65535 set ikev1 trans-
form-set ESP-AES-128-SHA ESP-AES-128-MD5 ESP-AES-192-SHA ESP-AES-192-
MD5 ESP-AES-256-SHA ESP-AES-256-MD5 ESP-3DES-SHA ESP-3DES-MD5 ESP-DES-
SHA ESP-DES-MD5 
crypto map outside_map 65535 ipsec-isakmp dynamic SYS-
TEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAP 
crypto map outside_map interface outside 
crypto ikev1 enable outside 
crypto ikev1 policy 10 
 authentication crack 
 encryption aes-256 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 20 
 authentication rsa-sig 
 encryption aes-256 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 30 
 authentication pre-share 
 encryption aes-256 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 40 
 authentication crack 
 encryption aes-192 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 50 
 authentication rsa-sig 
 encryption aes-192 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
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crypto ikev1 policy 60 
 authentication pre-share 
 encryption aes-192 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 70 
 authentication crack 
 encryption aes 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 80 
 authentication rsa-sig 
 encryption aes 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 90 
 authentication pre-share 
 encryption aes 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 100 
 authentication crack 
 encryption 3des 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 110 
 authentication rsa-sig 
 encryption 3des 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 120 
 authentication pre-share 
 encryption 3des 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 130 
 authentication crack 
 encryption des 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 140 
 authentication rsa-sig 
 encryption des 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
 lifetime 86400 
crypto ikev1 policy 150 
 authentication pre-share 
 encryption des 
 hash sha 
 group 2 
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 lifetime 86400 
telnet timeout 5 
ssh 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 inside 
ssh timeout 10 
ssh key-exchange group dh-group1-sha1 
console timeout 0 
 
dhcpd auto_config outside 
! 
threat-detection basic-threat 
threat-detection statistics access-list 
no threat-detection statistics tcp-intercept 
webvpn 
group-policy testgroup internal 
group-policy testgroup attributes 
 dns-server value 10.94.1.4 
 vpn-tunnel-protocol ikev1 
 split-tunnel-policy tunnelspecified 
 split-tunnel-network-list value testgroup_splitTunnelAcl 
 default-domain value mydomain.com 
username tame password iOr58rasLrrZeZhx encrypted 
username tame attributes 
 service-type admin 
username tame1 password iOr58rasLrrZeZhx encrypted privilege 0 
username tame1 attributes 
 vpn-group-policy testgroup 
tunnel-group testgroup type remote-access 
tunnel-group testgroup general-attributes 
 address-pool remotepool 
 default-group-policy testgroup 
tunnel-group testgroup ipsec-attributes 
 ikev1 pre-shared-key ***** 
! 
class-map inspection_default 
 match default-inspection-traffic 
! 
! 
policy-map type inspect dns preset_dns_map 
 parameters 
  message-length maximum client auto 
  message-length maximum 512 
policy-map global_policy 
 class inspection_default 
  inspect dns preset_dns_map 
  inspect ftp 
  inspect h323 h225 
  inspect h323 ras 
  inspect rsh 
  inspect rtsp 
  inspect esmtp 
  inspect sqlnet 
  inspect skinny 
  inspect sunrpc 
  inspect xdmcp 
  inspect sip 
  inspect netbios 
  inspect tftp 
  inspect ip-options 
  inspect icmp 
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! 
service-policy global_policy global 
prompt hostname context 
no call-home reporting anonymous 
Cryptochecksum:ee11514827e8bf7c2946c10d1e8eced2 
: end 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 2: Core Switch Configuration  
 
CSW# show running-config 
 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 5317 bytes 
! 
! Last configuration change at 03:00:03 UTC Mon Mar 1 1993 
! 
version 12.2 
no service pad 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
service password-encryption 
! 
hostname CSW 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
! 
enable secret 5 $1$Nh/1$bmSgITR31VtxLu.4mc7Wo. 
! 
username tame password 7 071B20414B1D180812 
no aaa new-model 
system mtu routing 1500 
ip routing 
no ip domain-lookup 
ip domain-name mydomain.com 
! 
ip dhcp excluded-address 192.168.30.1 
ip dhcp excluded-address 192.168.40.1 
! 
ip dhcp pool AP_pool_Guest 
   network 192.168.30.0 255.255.255.0 
   default-router 192.168.30.1 
! 
ip dhcp pool AP_pool_Worker 
   network 192.168.40.0 255.255.255.0 
   default-router 192.168.40.1 
! 
! 
! 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-2871021440 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-2871021440 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2871021440 
! 
! 
crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-2871021440 
 certificate self-signed 01 
  3082024C 308201B5 A0030201 02020101 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 
04050030 
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  31312F30 2D060355 04031326 494F532D 53656C66 2D536967 6E65642D 
43657274 
  69666963 6174652D 32383731 30323134 3430301E 170D3933 30333031 
30303031 
  30375A17 0D323030 31303130 30303030 305A3031 312F302D 06035504 
03132649 
  4F532D53 656C662D 5369676E 65642D43 65727469 66696361 74652D32 
38373130 
  32313434 3030819F 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 01050003 818D0030 
81890281 
  8100BE4A A175F73F 5386F919 11AB8945 5B497A79 B45136BE B6CFD58B 
062C46F2 
  F38C06DD 00052170 D5964B8E 7CE2C021 AC44FB28 EF7EF583 48BDA045 
15BBCDAD 
  2822CF7E 5495D032 71E59E73 44CFE70E F305DC4D EAFD246F 34D97CA6 
62F2A054 
  906C5291 D4DA6C80 9234C51B 18384B8B 4AD02E35 D743CC87 3932750E 
611D986A 
  4A2D0203 010001A3 74307230 0F060355 1D130101 FF040530 030101FF 
301F0603 
  551D1104 18301682 14436F72 655F5377 2E6D7964 6F6D6169 6E2E636F 
6D301F06 
  03551D23 04183016 801466C6 33FE8BB8 2D166D86 C32FBE33 CC2C7499 
1CCE301D 
  0603551D 0E041604 1466C633 FE8BB82D 166D86C3 2FBE33CC 2C74991C 
CE300D06 
  092A8648 86F70D01 01040500 03818100 872E2A78 C8EC8034 EF632F43 
8BB282B3 
  B24011BB 00FFB7D7 873861FF F5AEAFA6 3087A870 B931E379 96030151 
4838A5C1 
  5CDAA100 52C6DD71 1A9BB8CF 6FDD123E F136D649 C9077668 31528960 
8A495BFB 
  A38DA12F A51B433A 95F6C18F C8D1327F 61B7F3CE 35372032 E894F7F1 
9FE994BD 
  30F9F5C2 53C060C4 CF90E666 A754874D 
        quit 
! 
! 
! 
! 
spanning-tree mode pvst 
spanning-tree extend system-id 
spanning-tree vlan 1,30,40,50,60,70,100 priority 0 
! 
vlan internal allocation policy ascending 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 description "to the ASA device" 
 no switchport 
 ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 shutdown 
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! 
interface FastEthernet0/3 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/4 
 description " to the AP" 
 switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q 
 switchport trunk native vlan 100 
 switchport trunk allowed vlan 30,40,100 
 switchport mode trunk 
 switchport nonegotiate 
 storm-control broadcast level 50.00 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/5 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/6 
 description " to switch 1" 
 switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q 
 switchport trunk native vlan 100 
 switchport mode trunk 
 switchport nonegotiate 
 storm-control broadcast level 50.00 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/7 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/8 
 description " to switch 2" 
 switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q 
 switchport trunk native vlan 100 
 switchport mode trunk 
 switchport nonegotiate 
 storm-control broadcast level 50.00 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/9 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/10 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/11 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/12 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/13 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/14 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/15 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/16 
 shutdown 
! 
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interface FastEthernet0/17 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/18 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/19 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/20 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/21 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/22 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/23 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/24 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan30 
 description "Guest vlan" 
 ip address 192.168.30.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Vlan40 
 description "mobile worker vlan" 
 ip address 192.168.40.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Vlan50 
 description "workstation one vlan" 
 ip address 192.168.50.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Vlan60 
 description "workstation two vlan" 
 ip address 192.168.60.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Vlan70 
 description "server farm vlan" 
 ip address 192.168.70.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Vlan100 
 description "management vlan" 
 ip address 192.168.100.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
no ip http server 
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ip http access-class 1 
ip http secure-server 
! 
! 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.1.1 
! 
logging esm config 
access-list 1 permit 192.168.100.0 
! 
! 
banner motd ^C unauthorized user is not prohibited ^C 
! 
line con 0 
 access-class 1 in 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 06120E2C495A081400 
 logging synchronous 
 login 
line vty 0 4 
 access-class 1 in 
 exec-timeout 5 0 
 privilege level 15 
 password 7 06120E2C495A081400 
 logging synchronous 
 login local 
 transport input ssh 
line vty 5 15 
 no login 
! 
End 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
12 (27) 
 
 
Appendix 3: Access Switch (SW1) Configuration 
 
SW1# show running-config  
 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 4308 bytes 
! 
version 12.2 
no service pad 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
service password-encryption 
! 
hostname SW1 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
enable secret 5 $1$G6/O$eoEkanvGfe6nCsCUlqw5w. 
! 
username tame privilege 15 secret 5 $1$H/Z2$wkFjs2z5SjmrcTNwVOZf6/ 
aaa new-model 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
aaa session-id common 
system mtu routing 1500 
ip subnet-zero 
! 
ip domain-name mydomain.com 
! 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-2876515968 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-2876515968 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2876515968 
! 
! 
crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-2876515968 
 certificate self-signed 01 
  30820248 308201B1 A0030201 02020101 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 
04050030 
  31312F30 2D060355 04031326 494F532D 53656C66 2D536967 6E65642D 
43657274 
  69666963 6174652D 32383736 35313539 3638301E 170D3933 30333031 
30303030 
  34365A17 0D323030 31303130 30303030 305A3031 312F302D 06035504 
03132649 
  4F532D53 656C662D 5369676E 65642D43 65727469 66696361 74652D32 
38373635 
  31353936 3830819F 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 01050003 818D0030 
81890281 
  8100B266 A4DA86C3 4B259BB5 8250DBED 077258E3 3F87B1AB 1B7CC99B 
0CF0BD4E 
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  C7CCEEB3 DC0791F0 C9D4313F 614D10F8 FE40BBE6 006DBB3A 2C56FF66 
7757A665 
  55D32D53 83F0B397 0A0211E4 A5D72EB3 8204A138 C3E2D4DD 5CAF9D50 
6AF46A2C 
  FC0D2195 915C3E10 FC2B9197 081E54D7 01CBFC95 AEC564DB DF458FFD 
626F7250 
  F3B90203 010001A3 70306E30 0F060355 1D130101 FF040530 030101FF 
301B0603 
  551D1104 14301282 10535731 2E6D7964 6F6D6169 6E2E636F 6D301F06 
03551D23 
  04183016 8014E236 018E8541 BBA6A323 C59B0BFC 7BA03AB2 0E62301D 
0603551D 
  0E041604 14E23601 8E8541BB A6A323C5 9B0BFC7B A03AB20E 62300D06 
092A8648 
  86F70D01 01040500 03818100 4AFA61A3 8A0E0257 1D1F0A68 87D8AFD8 
7A054A10 
  999235D3 9B29595A 1CCBCC13 C4229593 D729088F 0DFB824C CD63FD6E 
D2C9B238 
  B9C6C236 52AC2CED 4058A6A5 DCBC0996 F37C1553 87647CB1 8745DCA7 
6D7EF50A 
  5B91D6A2 944D987F F83FFA88 DDD42651 86647C88 AC569FEA DCCDC781 
F629F8D8 
  39ECD3BD DA1F4270 8291D717 
  quit 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
spanning-tree mode pvst 
spanning-tree extend system-id 
! 
vlan internal allocation policy ascending 
! 
! 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/3 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/4 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/5 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/6 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/7 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/8 
 description "to core switch" 
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 switchport trunk native vlan 100 
 switchport trunk allowed vlan 30,40,50,60,70,80,100 
 switchport mode trunk 
 switchport nonegotiate 
 storm-control broadcast level 50.00 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/9 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/10 
 description "workstation one access port" 
 switchport access vlan 50 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 spanning-tree portfast 
 spanning-tree bpduguard enable 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/11 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/12 
 description "management workstation access port" 
 switchport access vlan 100 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 spanning-tree portfast 
 spanning-tree bpduguard enable 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/13 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/14 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/15 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/16 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/17 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/18 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/19 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/20 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/21 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/22 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/23 
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 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/24 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan1 
 no ip address 
 no ip route-cache 
! 
interface Vlan100 
 ip address 192.168.100.2 255.255.255.0 
 no ip route-cache 
! 
ip default-gateway 192.168.100.1 
no ip http server 
ip http access-class 1 
ip http secure-server 
access-list 1 permit 192.168.100.4 
! 
control-plane 
! 
banner motd ^C unauthorized user is not prohibited ^C 
! 
line con 0 
 access-class 1 in 
 exec-timeout 5 0 
 password 7 0010120B014F0A0B0A 
 logging synchronous 
line vty 0 4 
 access-class 1 in 
 exec-timeout 5 0 
 password 7 021205560E 
 logging synchronous 
 transport input ssh 
line vty 5 15 
! 
end 
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Appendix 4: Access Switch (SW2) Configuration 
 
SW2# show running-config 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 4328 bytes 
! 
version 12.2 
no service pad 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
service password-encryption 
! 
hostname SW2 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
enable secret 5 $1$9u6H$Y33Dbas7.NTucwQ2BxJES1 
! 
username tame password 7 120D041A171F0D092F 
aaa new-model 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
aaa session-id common 
system mtu routing 1500 
ip subnet-zero 
! 
ip domain-name mydomain.com 
! 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-2878419584 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-2878419584 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2878419584 
! 
! 
crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-2878419584 
 certificate self-signed 01 
  30820248 308201B1 A0030201 02020101 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 
04050030 
  31312F30 2D060355 04031326 494F532D 53656C66 2D536967 6E65642D 
43657274 
  69666963 6174652D 32383738 34313935 3834301E 170D3933 30333031 
30303030 
  34365A17 0D323030 31303130 30303030 305A3031 312F302D 06035504 
03132649 
  4F532D53 656C662D 5369676E 65642D43 65727469 66696361 74652D32 
38373834 
  31393538 3430819F 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 01050003 818D0030 
81890281 
  8100A1DC D170542B 245EDCD1 DC993EED CB5FC320 D764AF42 85286AA0 
401DA57A 
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  E3202617 830828A6 395074F2 0089CB14 09337048 A5E878A0 E4C07E47 
934FE8A4 
  D2D4AEA9 BB1A31AB AA9ABCD4 81EC72C3 D7D17F3A 1A8DAF9D 150CF31E 
4AD65FC7 
  B0B63029 CAE3460D E1E68071 1EFBF2EA ED256D21 9BC8376A 0BD3CEFC 
B01A4C30 
  27550203 010001A3 70306E30 0F060355 1D130101 FF040530 030101FF 
301B0603 
  551D1104 14301282 10535732 2E6D7964 6F6D6169 6E2E636F 6D301F06 
03551D23 
  04183016 8014FC46 FAD07283 742702AB 2A7539F9 E77347F1 1139301D 
0603551D 
  0E041604 14FC46FA D0728374 2702AB2A 7539F9E7 7347F111 39300D06 
092A8648 
  86F70D01 01040500 03818100 0B5971C6 0DF1382E 1CA59FB4 B6E5E30F 
CD9C10BE 
  D814F4CD 361FD35D 97C2783B 773FAD13 D7DEB374 F5B64D1E CE3582C7 
6EBE839D 
  68C11940 29515570 D2244880 821B6DA1 D4E6033D B90F6AB4 C2333F3E 
AB841EE9 
  18850678 36F20FD7 D4581828 66C90F42 96A885A3 2764ED50 F27CCB6A 
8C05EE4A 
  CFA572AE E09108C8 347DF3F9 
  quit 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
spanning-tree mode pvst 
spanning-tree extend system-id 
! 
vlan internal allocation policy ascending 
! 
ip ssh time-out 10 
! 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/3 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/4 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/5 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/6 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/7 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/8 
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 description "to core switch" 
 switchport trunk native vlan 100 
 switchport trunk allowed vlan 30,40,50,60,70,100 
 switchport mode trunk 
 switchport nonegotiate 
 storm-control broadcast level 50.00 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/9 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/10 
 description "workstation two access port" 
 switchport access vlan 60 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 spanning-tree portfast 
 spanning-tree bpduguard enable 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/11 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/12 
 description "internal serve access port" 
 switchport access vlan 70 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 spanning-tree portfast 
 spanning-tree bpduguard enable 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/13 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/14 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/15 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/16 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/17 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/18 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/19 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/20 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/21 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/22 
 shutdown 
! 
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interface FastEthernet0/23 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/24 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan1 
 no ip address 
 no ip route-cache 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan100 
 ip address 192.168.100.3 255.255.255.0 
 no ip route-cache 
! 
ip default-gateway 192.168.100.1 
no ip http server 
ip http access-class 1 
ip http secure-server 
access-list 1 permit 192.168.100.4 
! 
control-plane 
! 
banner motd ^C unautherized user is not prohibited ^C 
! 
line con 0 
 access-class 1 in 
 exec-timeout 5 0 
 password 7 051F070224584F041C 
 logging synchronous 
line vty 0 4 
 access-class 1 in 
 exec-timeout 5 0 
 password 7 051F070224584F041C 
 logging synchronous 
 transport input ssh 
line vty 5 15 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
! 
end 
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Appendix 5: Access Point Configuration 
 
AP#show running-config 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 6194 bytes 
! 
version 12.3 
no service pad 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
service password-encryption 
! 
hostname AP 
! 
! 
ip subnet-zero 
ip domain name mydomain.com 
ip name-server 10.94.1.4 
! 
! 
aaa new-model 
! 
! 
aaa group server radius rad_eap 
! 
aaa group server radius rad_mac 
! 
aaa group server radius rad_acct 
! 
aaa group server radius rad_admin 
! 
aaa group server tacacs+ tac_admin 
! 
aaa group server radius rad_pmip 
! 
aaa group server radius dummy 
! 
aaa authentication login default local 
aaa authentication login eap_methods group rad_eap 
aaa authentication login mac_methods local 
aaa authorization exec default local 
aaa accounting network acct_methods start-stop group rad_acct 
aaa session-id common 
! 
dot11 ssid guest 
   vlan 30 
   authentication open 
   mbssid guest-mode 
! 
dot11 ssid worker 
   vlan 40 
   authentication open 
   mbssid guest-mode 
! 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-3139600724 
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 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-3139600724 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-3139600724 
! 
! 
crypto ca certificate chain TP-self-signed-3139600724 
 certificate self-signed 01 
  3082022B 30820194 A0030201 02020101 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 
04050030 
  31312F30 2D060355 04031326 494F532D 53656C66 2D536967 6E65642D 
43657274 
  69666963 6174652D 33313339 36303037 3234301E 170D3133 30343232 
31353331 
  33305A17 0D323030 31303130 30303030 305A3031 312F302D 06035504 
03132649 
  4F532D53 656C662D 5369676E 65642D43 65727469 66696361 74652D33 
31333936 
  30303732 3430819F 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 01050003 818D0030 
81890281 
  8100E081 0480ACB9 92D5E4E5 5D4311F5 DE462CF8 B58E0B8D C792A58B 
5403DF84 
  E27D17FE 66269146 5F43A7A5 CDF54913 FEF46420 9D036439 A59D4D43 
64453426 
  5EA474F2 23A5AE8B BBB4D476 231EDA9B 824C4C4A D120F2D5 4EF54E6F 
658D0F4B 
  66DD8309 A5AF25EE 028537AA 066FFD62 DE0B7856 17CD242B 1CAB65E1 
8DF89D82 
  2FEB0203 010001A3 53305130 0F060355 1D130101 FF040530 030101FF 
301F0603 
  551D2304 18301680 148D41AC 6EEF8A7A 835873CB B8C3543E 6C2CEC20 
93301D06 
  03551D0E 04160414 8D41AC6E EF8A7A83 5873CBB8 C3543E6C 2CEC2093 
300D0609 
  2A864886 F70D0101 04050003 81810003 CEA0FC6A 70A758C2 AA4183A6 
5D12CC84 
  1E059CC0 035DCD47 8B5E1B4D 13C82F0B 6E26EDBE 95BB8912 E77DB4BB 
AB64C826 
  A27004A3 B10F8D8D 4EA418EF 7158CC07 2E7B414B D8A941E5 331F6B7E 
42BBE77E 
  514630DE C499A855 70E61EF7 3779CE0D 39BE34E4 4BD13DF4 B9DAEB3F 
340B1B0F 
  23971EC3 9AFCAB2B 88616BAA 959E41 
  quit 
username tame privilege 15 password 7 120D041A171F0D092F 
username tame2 password 7 09584F041C11161F0E5E 
! 
bridge irb 
! 
! 
interface Dot11Radio0 
 no ip address 
 no ip route-cache 
 ! 
 encryption mode ciphers aes-ccm 
 ! 
 encryption vlan 30 key 1 size 128bit 7 F70212836BFB29783FA0A5E65A95 
transmit-key 
 encryption vlan 30 mode wep optional 
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 ! 
 encryption vlan 40 key 1 size 128bit 7 E6150A7B949EC21B725817485642 
transmit-key 
 encryption vlan 40 mode wep mandatory 
 ! 
 encryption vlan 100 key 1 size 128bit 7 B40E12774AB6C52D1761DC68F37A 
transmit-key 
 encryption vlan 100 mode wep mandatory 
 ! 
 broadcast-key vlan 30 change 300 membership-termination capability-
change 
 ! 
 broadcast-key vlan 40 change 300 membership-termination capability-
change 
 ! 
 broadcast-key vlan 100 change 300 membership-termination capability-
change 
 ! 
 ! 
 ssid guest 
 ! 
 ssid worker 
 ! 
 mbssid 
 speed basic-1.0 basic-2.0 basic-5.5 6.0 9.0 basic-11.0 12.0 18.0 24.0 
36.0 48.0 54.0 
 station-role root 
! 
interface Dot11Radio0.30 
 encapsulation dot1Q 30 
 no ip route-cache 
 bridge-group 30 
 bridge-group 30 subscriber-loop-control 
 bridge-group 30 block-unknown-source 
 no bridge-group 30 source-learning 
 no bridge-group 30 unicast-flooding 
 bridge-group 30 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface Dot11Radio0.40 
 encapsulation dot1Q 40 
 no ip route-cache 
 bridge-group 40 
 bridge-group 40 subscriber-loop-control 
 bridge-group 40 block-unknown-source 
 no bridge-group 40 source-learning 
 no bridge-group 40 unicast-flooding 
 bridge-group 40 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface Dot11Radio0.100 
 encapsulation dot1Q 100 native 
 no ip route-cache 
 bridge-group 1 
 bridge-group 1 block-unknown-source 
 no bridge-group 1 source-learning 
 no bridge-group 1 unicast-flooding 
 bridge-group 1 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface Dot11Radio1 
 no ip address 
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 no ip route-cache 
 shutdown 
 speed basic-6.0 9.0 basic-12.0 18.0 basic-24.0 36.0 48.0 54.0 
 station-role root 
 bridge-group 1 
 bridge-group 1 subscriber-loop-control 
 bridge-group 1 block-unknown-source 
 no bridge-group 1 source-learning 
 no bridge-group 1 unicast-flooding 
 bridge-group 1 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface FastEthernet0 
 no ip address 
 no ip route-cache 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 hold-queue 160 in 
! 
interface FastEthernet0.30 
 encapsulation dot1Q 30 
 no ip route-cache 
 bridge-group 30 
 no bridge-group 30 source-learning 
 bridge-group 30 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface FastEthernet0.40 
 encapsulation dot1Q 40 
 no ip route-cache 
 bridge-group 40 
 no bridge-group 40 source-learning 
 bridge-group 40 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface FastEthernet0.100 
 encapsulation dot1Q 100 native 
 no ip route-cache 
 bridge-group 1 
 no bridge-group 1 source-learning 
 bridge-group 1 spanning-disabled 
! 
interface BVI1 
 ip address 192.168.100.5 255.255.255.0 
 no ip route-cache 
! 
ip default-gateway 192.168.100.1 
no ip http server 
ip http authentication aaa 
ip http secure-server 
ip http help-path 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/779/smbiz/prodconfig/help/eag 
ip radius source-interface BVI1 
! 
access-list 1 permit 192.168.100.4 
access-list 111 permit tcp any any neq telnet 
radius-server local 
  no authentication eapfast 
  no authentication mac 
  nas 192.168.100.5 key 7 06120E2C495A081400 
  user tame nthash 7 
040B2D5329751A175D3D5D36475A5B257C7E007B106370445743535373780A0676 
Appendix 1 
24 (27) 
 
 
! 
radius-server attribute 32 include-in-access-req format %h 
radius-server host 192.168.100.5 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813 key 7 
03105A06031B20414B 
radius-server vsa send accounting 
! 
control-plane 
! 
bridge 1 route ip 
! 
! 
banner motd ^C unautherized user is not prohibited ^C 
! 
line con 0 
 access-class 1 in 
 password 7 1403130609102B2621 
line vty 0 4 
 access-class 1 in 
 password 7 010707095E1F070224 
 transport input ssh 
! 
End 
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Appendix 6: Testing Listing 
 
Verification of Inside Network Connection  
 
SA# show route 
 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - 
BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
       i - IS-IS, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2, ia - IS-IS 
inter area 
       * - candidate default, U - per-user static route, o - ODR 
       P - periodic downloaded static route 
 
Gateway of last resort is 10.94.62.254 to network 0.0.0.0 
 
S    192.168.30.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
S    192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
S    192.168.40.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
S    172.16.10.10 255.255.255.255 [1/0] via 10.94.62.118, outside 
C    10.94.62.0 255.255.255.0 is directly connected, outside 
S    192.168.50.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
C    192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 is directly connected, inside 
C    192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 is directly connected, dmz 
S    192.168.70.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
S    192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.2, inside 
S*   0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 [1/0] via 10.94.62.254, outside 
 
 
CSW#show ip route 
Codes: L - local, C - connected, S - static, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - 
BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2 
       i - IS-IS, su - IS-IS summary, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS 
level-2 
       ia - IS-IS inter area, * - candidate default, U - per-user 
static route 
       o - ODR, P - periodic downloaded static route, H - NHRP, l - 
LISP 
       + - replicated route, % - next hop override 
 
Gateway of last resort is 192.168.1.1 to network 0.0.0.0 
 
S*    0.0.0.0/0 [1/0] via 192.168.1.1 
      192.168.1.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.1.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/1 
L        192.168.1.2/32 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/1 
      192.168.30.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.30.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan30 
L        192.168.30.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan30 
      192.168.40.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.40.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan40 
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L        192.168.40.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan40 
      192.168.50.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.50.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan50 
L        192.168.50.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan50 
      192.168.60.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.60.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan60 
L        192.168.60.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan60 
      192.168.70.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.70.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan70 
L        192.168.70.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan70 
      192.168.100.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
C        192.168.100.0/24 is directly connected, Vlan100 
L        192.168.100.1/32 is directly connected, Vlan100 
 
 
ASA# ping 192.168.100.4 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.100.4, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/1/1 ms 
 
 
Verification of VPN Connection 
 
ASA# show vpn-sessiondb remote 
 
Session Type: IKEv1 IPsec 
 
Username     : tame1                  Index        : 1 
Assigned IP  : 172.16.10.10           Public IP    : 10.94.62.113 
Protocol     : IKEv1 IPsec 
License      : Other VPN 
Encryption   : AES256 AES128          Hashing      : SHA1 SHA1 
Bytes Tx     : 0                      Bytes Rx     : 0 
Group Policy : testgroup              Tunnel Group : testgroup 
Login Time   : 15:06:52 UTC Mon Apr 29 2013 
Duration     : 0h:09m:18s 
Inactivity   : 0h:00m:00s 
NAC Result   : Unknown 
VLAN Mapping : N/A                    VLAN         : none 
 
 
Verification of Wireless Connection 
 
AP#ping 192.168.100.4 
 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 192.168.100.4, timeout is 2 seconds: 
!!!!! 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/1/1 ms 
 
 
Verification of NATs Translation   
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ASA# sh xlate 
16 in use, 118 most used 
Flags: D - DNS, i - dynamic, r - portmap, s - static, I - identity, T 
- twice 
       e - extended 
NAT from inside:192.168.1.0/24 to outside:192.168.1.0/24 
    flags sI idle 1:16:58 timeout 0:00:00 
TCP PAT from dmz:192.168.2.3 21-21 to outside:10.94.62.251 21-21 
    flags sr idle 0:26:45 timeout 0:00:00 
TCP PAT from dmz:192.168.2.0/24 21-21 to outside:10.94.62.251 21-21 
    flags sr idle 0:26:45 timeout 0:00:00 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.100.4/1907 to outside:10.94.62.251/1907 
flags ri idle 0:00:57 timeout 0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.100.4/1901 to outside:10.94.62.251/1901 
flags ri idle 0:00:58 timeout 0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.100.4/1893 to outside:10.94.62.251/1893 
flags ri idle 0:00:58 timeout 0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.100.4/1885 to outside:10.94.62.251/1885 
flags ri idle 0:00:59 timeout 0:00:30 
UDP PAT from inside:192.168.100.4/64375 to outside:10.94.62.251/64375 
flags ri idle 0:02:33 timeout 0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.30.2/50535 to outside:10.94.62.251/50535 
flags ri idle 0:00:31 timeout 0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.30.2/50532 to outside:10.94.62.251/50532 
flags ri idle 0:00:31 timeout 0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.30.2/50530 to outside:10.94.62.251/50530 
flags ri idle 0:01:56 timeout 0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.30.2/50528 to outside:10.94.62.251/50528 
flags ri idle 0:01:56 timeout 0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.30.2/50524 to outside:10.94.62.251/50524 
flags ri idle 0:01:56 timeout 0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.30.2/50522 to outside:10.94.62.251/50522 
flags ri idle 0:01:57 timeout 0:00:30 
TCP PAT from inside:192.168.30.2/50510 to outside:10.94.62.251/50510 
flags ri idle 1:05:47 timeout 0:00:30 
UDP PAT from inside:192.168.70.3/52291 to outside:10.94.62.251/52291 
flags ri idle 0:05:06 timeout 0:00:30 
